October 1981 Unemployment, Unsatisfied Demand for Labor, and Compensation Growth in the United States, 1956States, -1980 ABSTRACT This paper presents two key facts which call into question the value of unemployment rates as barometers of labor market tightness.
Virtually all empirical analyses of short run aggregate wage growth have an unemployment rate at their heart.' What lies behind the expected inverse relationship between unemployment and the rate of growth in wages?
The following quotation clearly presents the standard rationale for including an unemployment rate variable in wage growth regressions: "In a given labor market, wages tend to rise under conditions of excess demand, fall with excess supply, arid remain constant when excess demands are zero.
Since the aggregate unemployment rate is a good indicator of the general state of labor markets, as unemployment decreases, more and more markets come into a state of excess demand and the general pace of wage inflation increases.
For an unemployment rate to in fact be "a good indicator of the general state of labor markets," two conditions must be satisfied. First, a given unemployment rate must represent the same number of available units of labor at each point in time. Second, the relationship between the number of available units of labor and labor market tightness must remain constant, which implies that there must be stability in the relationship between number of units of labor available and unsatisfied labor demand. Thus, if the unemployment rate does not mirror the number of available units of labor or if the importance of structural unemployment changes over time, the unemployment rate will not be a good indicator of wage pressure from labor market imbalance. This paper presents evidence concerning the use of various unemployment rates as barometers of tightness in the labor market. In Section I, we demonstrate that proxies for the unsatisfied demand for labor (the help wanted index and the manufacturing quit rate) perform at least as well as either the official or the prime age male unemployment rate when entered alone in wage growth regressions. Moreover, we find that in regressions which include both an unemployment rate and a measure of unsatisfied labor demand, the unemployment rate does not matter while the unsatisfied demand proxy does. The second section presents evidence which strongly suggests that, at least for the United States, a substantial fraction of the growing instability in Phillips relationships (again defined in terms of either the official or prime age male unemployment rates) can be linked to growing instability in the relationship between unsatisfied labor demand and the relevant rate of unemployment. Furthermore, the relationship between our unsatisfied demand proxies and the rate of compensation growth appears to have been more stable than the relationship between unemployment and the rate of compensation growth. In sum, measures of employers' unsatisfied labor demand dominate measured unemployment rates as indicators of wage pressure emanating from labor market conditions. Section III discusses the interpretation of our empirical findings. The paper's concluding section discusses the main implication of our analysis for:macroecoflomic theory and policy, that labor market pressure on wages can be more reliably assessed by looking at measures of unsatisfied demand than at the unemployment rates which have played the key role in earlier analyses, and emphasizes the need for new microdata if we are to fully understand why. 
Compensation Growth and Its Correlates
Most economists would think it important to consider the role of "tight" versus "loose" labor markets as part of any study of wage growth. Since the appearance of Phillips' very influential 1958 article, most econometric analyses of wage growth have attempted to gauge the degree of labor market tightness with an unemployment rate variable. An alternative approach would be to use available proxies for the unsatisfied demand for labor to assess how tight labor markets are. In this section, two such variables are experimented with. These unsatisfied demand variables perform well when they replace the unemployment rate in standard compensation growth equations. Of greater interest, however, is the finding that in compensaticn growth equations which include both an unemployment variable and an unsatisfied demand proxy, only the unsatisfied demand variable matters.
Model Specification
While the rationale for including an unemployment rate variable in wage growth equations is not always clearly stated, the most prevalant notion seems to be that the unemployment rate should be highly correlated with the degree of excess demand in the labor market. A similar argument might be made regarding the inclusion of some measure of employers' unsatisfied demand for labor in place of an unemployment rate variable. A priori, such a measure should be at least as likely as any unemployment rate to be highly correlated with the excess demand for labor.
The labor market variable which has most commonly appeared in wage growth equations is the official unemployment rate. One important question 4 is whether the official (total civilian labor force) unemployment rate adequately reflects the availability of qualified potential employees.
Various researchers have argued that women and teenagers are less likely to possess, or to be seen as possessing, requisite oh skills and comrdtment than prime age males. This line of reasoning h8s lead many to believe that the prime age male (men 25 to 5L) unemloYment rate might he a better variable to use in wage growth equations than the official rate.
As mentioned above, measures of the unsatisfied demand for labor could be substituted for the unemployment rate in wage growth models.
One likely candidate for the job of measuring the degree to which employers' demands for labor are unsatisfied is the job vacancy rate. Another possible unsatisfied demand measure is the fraction of employers' work forces choosing to leave their jobs during a given time period. Some job vacancies arise because a new job has been created rather than because someone has quit and the job vacancy rate reflects both the flow and the duration of job openings, so that the vacancy rate and the quit rate will not mirror each other perfectly. Nonetheless, the quit rate should be highly correlated with the seemingly better unsatisfied demand proxy, the vacancy rate.
The first compensation growth equations presented in this paper include either an unemployment rate:
where 1/w is the rate of growth of nominal hourly compensation, u is the chosen unemployment rate, d is the chosen unsatisfied demand proxy, is the rate of inflation in period t-j, and c, 3, y and the 1. are regression coefficients. 5 The reasoning behind including labor market variables in wage growth equations stated above implies that 3 should be positive (unemployment negatively related to the rate of wage growth) and that y should be negative (unsatisfied demand positively related to the rate of wage growth).
One way to ascertain whether unemployment rates or our unsatisfied demand proxies represent better measures of labor market tightness might be to include both together in estimated Phillips-type equations. For this reason, perhaps the most interesting wage growth regressions presented in this paper are those which include both an unemployment rate and a measure of unsatisfied demand.
The relevant regression model can be written as:
where all the variables are defined as above.
The Role of Inflation
We have included either four or sixteen lagged inflation values ((k/p).
terms) in the compensation growth equations presented in this paper instead of a single variable intended to capture the expected rate of inflation in the current period ((/p)). There are several considerations which lead us to this course of action.
First, there is rio generally accepted expected inflation series which we could have used even had we wanted to. The usual approach to generating an expected inflation series is to assume that people expect a current rate of inflation equal to some distributed lag function of past inflation, with the distributed lag weights based on previous inflation history. This seems unrealistic insofar as many factors other than past rates of inflation will have an effect on current inflationary expectations. One way to construct a more realistic expected inflation series might be to survey a random sample where union wage contracts are typically set for three years at a time, some period t wage changes may reflect period t price change expectations generated up to three years earlier, rather than period t price change expectations based on information through period t-l.
A similar situation will exist in nonunion establishments to the extent that across-the--board wage increases may occur only at annual intervals. Entering a large number of lagged inflation terms (we experiment with as many as sixteen) may allow us to capture the price change expectations which should have existed at the time the oldest union contract still in force as of period t would have been negotiated, at least to the extent that price change expectations are a function of past price changes. Including a single (Ip) variable based on a rolling ARIMA or other mechanistic model using price data through period t-l would have been considerably more restrictive.
Perhaps more fundamentally, there is no clear reason why quarter t wage changes should reflect only quarter t expected price changes. Particularly where workers remain attached to the same employers over relatively long time periods,4 moiey wanes may reflect the expected pace of inflation over some longer horizon but not necessarily during a single quarter. One would expect the parties negotiating a wage bargain in period t to be concerned about the 7 expected rates of inflation in periods t, t+l, t+2, and so on through period t+n, the end of the relevant time horizon. Again, entering lagged inflation terms rather than a single (IIp) term based on inflation through period t-l allows added flexibility; the coefficients on lagged price terms may reflect their influence on longer term as well as on current period inflationary expectations.
Finally, to the extent that inflation is not always perfectly foreseen, past rates of inflation may play an important role in their own right rather than solely because they influence expectations.
Under many union contracts, cost of living adjustment (COLA) clauses provide for wage increases tied directly to the rate of inflation; union members covered by COLA clauses ar€ thus at least partially protected against unforeseen price increases. Where prices have grown faster than wages, both union and nonunion workers may receive "catch-up" wage increases that are independent of what the rate of inflation is expected to be in the future. The existence of both COLA and "catch-up"
wage increases provides an additional rationale for including lagged inflation terms in wage growth equations.
To summarize, the two main reasons we chose to specify our wage terms on the right hand side. The hourly compensation series we used for calculating *1w, the rate of growth in nominal compensation, was generated by BLS; they divided total compensation of nonfarm business sector employees as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts by the total number of payroll hours in private nonagricultural establishments.
The employee compensation figure in the National Accounts includes wages and salaries, employer contributions to social insurance programs such as Social Security and unemployment insurance, and other labor income such as employer contributions to private pension and welfare funds.8
As noted above, we entered either four or sixteen lagged inflation variables into all our regression models. As far as the choice of an appropriate price deflator series to use for cDnstructing these lagged inflation terms, it is important to note that in a world with more than one commodity, the price series that is relevant for suppliers of labor will very likely differ from the price series that is relevant for demanders of labor. One would expect labor suppliers to be concerned about their earnings relative to the price of the bundle of commodities they consume, whereas labor demanders should be concerned about the wages they pay relative to their product prices. Using lagged inflation terms based on the Gros Natiohal Product (CNP) deflator thus seemed like a reasonable compromise between the price relevant to consumers and the price relevant to producers.
The Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) computer system was the source of all of the data and programs used in conducting the analyses under discussion.
All of the reported regressions were fit on the DRI system with seasonally adjusted quarterly data for 1956:1 through 1980:3 and were estimated using a maximum likelihood correction for first-order serial correlation.9
Compensation Growth: Unutilized Supplyersus Unsatisfied Demand This would seem to suggest that the unsatisfied demand variables work better than the unemployment rates we have used; however, the magnitude of the differences in R's between the two sets of models are small, so no strong conclusion regarding the relative strength of the various labor market variables seems warranted on this basis alone.1 The Sensitivity of Our Results to Alternative Spçifications Thus far we have explicitly or implicitly made a number of assumptions about the "proper" specification of the compensation growth models we have estimated. Fortunately, our central conclusions appear to be quite robust with respect to alternative plausible specifications.
The key compensation growth (i/w) models presented in the text included an unsatisfied demand variable (either the help wanted index or the quit rate) in inverse form (lid). We chose this functional form because it matched the way the unemployment rate is usually entered in this sort of regression (as 1/u) and because regressions with both d and d2 as independent variables indicated that 'z/w increases with d at a decreasing rate. We did replicate all of the relevant Table 1 and A third possibility we considered was that unemployment and/or our unsatisfied demand variables might affect /w with some lag rather than concurrently. To determine whether allowing for delayed impacts would alter our central conclusions, we re-estimated each of the models in Table 1 and It should also be noted that the inverse of this overtime hours variable performed in very much the same way as the inverse of the help wanted index or the inverse of the quit rate when used alone as a proxy for unsatisfied demand in models like those in Table 1 and Table 2. A sixth issue which deserves mention is our choice of an inflation series to appear on the right hand side of our compensation growth models.
We picked the GNP deflator in an attempt to strike a compromise between the prices most relevant to labor suppliers and the price most relevant to labor demanders. Redoing the Table 1 and Table 2 analyses with a more "supplier oriented" price index (the Implicit Consumption deflator, considered vastly superior to the Consumer Price Index because of its treatment of housing expenditures) and then again with a more "demander oriented" price index (the Wholesale Price index) changed none of our conclusions.
Thus, the central implications of the compensation growth equations reported in Table 1 and Table 2 appear to be quite robust with respect to 16 the precise model specification used. When entered separately, both unemployment and our unsatisfied demand variables perform in the expected fashion, with unemployment negatively and unsatisfied demand positively related to the rate of compensation growth (although inevery instance but one the R2's in the unsatisfied demand models were larger than the 2's in the comparable unemployment models). However, in equations which include both an unemployment rate variable and an unsatisfied demand proxy, only the unsatisfied demand variable matters. We will wait until Section III to discuss a possible interpretation of these results.
II. Observed Instability in the Phillips Curve Relationship
One empirical phenomenon which has received considerable attention Plots of the Shifting Phillips Curve Figure 1A documents a fact that should be familiar to most readers: the rate of growth in compensation associated with any Normalized Help Wanted Index vs. Official Unemployment Rateb 1 . FIGURE 3: SHIFTING UNSATISFIED DENAND VARIABLE/PRIME AGE MALE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE CURVESa 2l 3A.
Normalized HeJ c. The monthly quit rate variable is the annual average of seasonally adjustednonthly rates. Adding an unsatisfied demand variable to equation (4) The first and fourth columns of Table 3 contain regressions of the following form estimated using the official unemployment rate and either four or sixteen lagged inflation terms:
The point estimate of the time trend coefficient in the model with four should drive S to zero. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) of Table 3 report coefficient estimates for equations with either the inverse of the normalized help wanted index or the manufacturing quit rate As was true with the official rate equations, adding an unsatisfied demand variable to the augmented prime age male Phillips curve equations seems to knock out the positive residual time trend. When the help wanted index variable is introduced, the point estimates of the time trend in the analagous official and prime age male unemployment rate equations respectively, as discussed above. In spite of the problems with our measures of unsatisfied demand, the Phillips-type compensation growth equations in Table 5 which contain an unsatisfied demand proxy rather than an unemployment rate do appear to be relatively more stable than the comparable equations in Table 3 and Table 4 .
We noted earlier that the help wanted index and the manufacturing quit rate are most certainly flawed measures of the level of unsatisfied demand for labor in the economy as a whole. It seems plausible that compensation growth equations estimated with a better unsatisfied demand variable, in particular a well measured job vacancy rate, should one become available, might exhibit even greater stability. Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis at present.
The Sensitivity of Our Results to Alternative_Specificaticns
In order to determine whether the conclusions just reached were robust with respect to alternative specifications, we reestimated the equations in Tables 3, 4 and 5 in each of the various ways we had previously reestimated the Table 1 Furthermore, if the trend in the measurement error in unemployment rates is greater than the comparable trend in our unsatisfied demand proxies, then a measurement error story could be used to explain the somewhat greater stability of Phillips curves defined in terms of unsatisfied demand proxies instead of unemployment rates. Most of our results can thus be explained in terms of a simple time trend measurement error in unemployment rates. However, a simple trend-related error could not explain our finding that, even after a time trend is entered into wage growth models, unsatisfied demand proxies still dominate unemployment rates when both are present. To explain this result, one must further suppose there to be some non-trend-related measurement error in unemployment rates which is greater than the comparable error in our unsatisfied demand measures. However, any non-trend-related error would not have to be just noise. For example, a one-time shift in the meaning of the unemployment rate as a measure of the effective unutilized labor supply would be imperfectly captured by a simple time trend, leaving a non-trend-related error component.
While the story we have just told seems plausible, a measurement error interpretation of our results may be suspect insofar as it is easy to believe that our unsatisfied demand proxies might be at least as poorly measured as our indicators of unutilized labor supply, the official and prime age male unemployment rates. Changes in the demographic composition of the labor force do seem to have played an important role in shifting the relationship between our unsatisfied demand variables and the official unemployment rate. As noted before, the shifts in the plots of the unsatisfied demand proxies against the prime age male unemployment rate appear to be less pronounced than the shifts in the comparable official unemployment rate plots. To summarize the magnitude of the shifts in these relationships, we estimated equations of the following form:
where d represents either the normalized help wanted index or the manufacturing quit rate, u represents either the official or the prime age male unemployment rate and t is a time trend. The time trend coefficients imply that the shift of the normalized help wanted index was approximately 32 percent smaller against the prime age male unemployment rate than against the official unemployment rate and that the shift of the manufacturing quit rate was approximately 40 percent smaller against the prime age male unemployment rate than against the official unemployment rate. This would seem to suggest that the changing age and sex structure of the labor force may account for a substantial fraction of the shift in the official rate curves. We also estimated a more complete set of models of the same form as equation (10), except with u equal in turn to the official unemployment rate, the prime age unemployment rate, and the prime age male unemployment rate. The time trend coefficients from the male (prime age male) unemployment rate curves were compared with those from the official (prime age) unemployment rate curves to assess the effect of changes in the sex structure of the labor face; the time trend coefficients from the prime age (prime age male) unemployment rate curves were held up against those from the official (male) unemployment rate curves to gauge the impact of changes in the age structure of the labor force. On the basis of these comparisons, it would appear that changes in sex structure are associated with factors which can explain between one quarter and one third, and changes in age structure with factors which can explain between two thirds and three quarters, of the difference between the magnitude of the outward shifts in the unsatisfied demand proxy/official unemployment rate curves and the magnitude of the less pronounced outward shifts in the unsatisfied demand proxy/prime age male unemployment rate curves.20 It is perhaps worth noting that shifts in the relationship between unsatisfied demand and unemployment occurring because of changes in demographic structure might reflect either a change in the number of available units of labor represented by the typical unemployed individual or increased structural imbalance. On the one hand, women, youth or older persons might desire to work fewer hours per week or be less committed to finding and keeping a job than others. On the other hand, these people might simply be less likely to possess (or be perceived by employers as less likely to possess) requisite job skills. To say the same thing in a slightly different way, the elasticity of substitution between prime age male workers and other workers might be infinite but with a prime age male worker equivalant on average to a larger number of effective labor units, or alternatively, the elasticity of substitution between prime age males and others might be less than infinite.
It seems likely that changes in UI coverage and benefits may have 
Conclusions and Directions
This paper has presented two key facts which call into question the value of unemployment rates as barometers of labor market tightness.
First, while both unemployment rates and unsatisfied labor demand proxies perform reasonably well on their own in compensation growth equations, in models which include both, only the unsatisfied demand variable appears to matter. Second, the past decade's outward shifts in Phillips plots can to a substantial degree be tied to outward shifts in plots pairing the relevant unemployment rate and unsatisfied demand proxies. We also found that Phillips relationships which are defined in terms of unsatisfied demand variables appear to be somewhat more stable than those using unemployment rates.
Taken together, our findings have a clear message for those concerned with macroeconomic theory and policy: measures of emnlovers' unsatisfied demand dominate unemployment rates as indicators of how labor market conditions are likely to affect wage growth.
Before the 1970's, the choice between various indicators of labor market tightness had little practical consequence, since the relationship between unsatisfied demand proxies and unemployment rates was so stable. Moreover, without some independent variation in the potential tightness indicators, it was not possible to determine which was "best." This all changed in the past ten years when relationships between unsatisfied demand proxies and unemployment rates broke down in many countries throughout the world. This event has allowed us to peek inside the black box which links unemployment rates and compensation growth. This glimpse has revealed that unemployment rates affect wage growth only to the extent that they are correlated with unsatisfied labor demand and has raised very basic questions about the whole wage growth process.
For us to fully understand the determinants of wage growth in our country, it would seem that the following queries must be addressed: How exactly does a wage-setting unit determine the rate of wage growth? Which factors are central and which are tangential in this process? What information is available to those determining wages? Does the shifting during the past decade of the curves which link unsatisfied demand proxies and unemployment rates reflect a diminished desire to work or growing structural unemployment? Thus, it appears to us that an analysis of the issues at hand has as a prerequisite the collection of new microdata. This paper has demonstrated that labor market pressure on wages can be more reliably assessed by looking at measures of unsatisfied labor demand than by looking at the unemployment rates which have played the key role in most earlier analyses. However, for now, our understanding of the reasons for this finding must remain incomplete. Nevertheless, we are confident that the collection and analysis of microdata can lead to a solution of this macro puzzle.
